Humphries v. Pulaski County Special School District, Nos. 08-2458/2594.
Background Information
Since 1982, the Pulaski County Special School District (the “District”) has been involved in desegregation litigation in federal court. In 1990, the District reached a settlement agreement, and the Office of Desegregation Management (“ODM”) was created to assist the trial court in supervising the District. In 2000, a new plan, Plan 2000, was submitted and approved by the trial court. Plan 2000 required to (1) recruit applicant for administrative positions in a manner designed to develop a racially diverse pool of applicants and (2) assign teachers and other staff in a manner that avoids racial identification of schools. The ODM continues to monitor the District for compliance with Plan 2000.
Facts
Donna Humphries, a white female with a doctorate degree in elementary education, has been employed with the District since 1984 and has worked as an elementary school counselor since 1989. Since 2001, Humphries has unsuccessfully applied for every elementary school assistant principal opening with the District. After complying with Equal Employment Opportunity Commission requirements, Humphries filed suit against the District, asserting claims of racial discrimination under Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983.
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Humphries alleged that the District undisputedly employed (1) a policy of using biracial interview committees for administrative personnel, (2) a preference to employ and advance blacks, (3) racial quotas and goals for hiring black administrators, (4) practice of hiring assistant principals so that at least one assistant principal is a different race than the school’s principals. She further alleged that statistical evidence established that the District favors black applicant’s in hiring administrative personnel. The District acknowledged its affirmative action policy included the first three goals noted above, but disputed specifically hiring assistant principals based on the race of the principal. The trial court granted the District’s motion, noting that Humphries failed to present any evidence that the affirmative action plan played any role in the District’s decisions not to promote her.
Appeal
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals joined the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits in holding the following:
[E]vidence that an employer followed an affirmative action plan in taking a challenged adverse employment action may constitute direct evidence of unlawful discrimination. If the employer defends by asserting that it acted pursuant to a valid affirmative action plan, the question then becomes whether the affirmative action plan is valid under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause.
The court then noted that, because the District had never denied the existence of its affirmative action policies, Humphries must show that (1) the District acted in accordance with those policies in failing to promote her and (2) the District’s policies are invalid. To be valid, an affirmative action policy must be (a) remedial and (b) narrowly tailored to meet the goal of remedying past discrimination. A court order is evidence of such a policy being remedial in nature; however, it cannot be to maintain racial quotas:
But a policy may not “unnecessarily trammel” the rights of non-minorities, and it must be “intended to attain a balance, not to maintain one.”
Because the trial court did not adequately address these issues in its order, the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the case back to the trial court.
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Thanks, Susan!
Considering that the Supreme Court has put a timeline on the 5th and 14th Amendments’ guarantees of equal protection, it is only a matter of time before all of these policies are declared unconstitutional.
It is absolutely disgusting to me that in the wake of what appears to be an admission by the District that they engaged in racially-motivated hiring decisions that the trial court didn’t even find this worthy of a trial on the merits.
I was surprised the court didn’t mention the recent firefighter decision myself. Based on court’s explanation, it does appear that the trial court prematurely granted summary judgment.
Thanks for your comments.
There is no “prematurely” granting summary judgment. Either the standard in the rules of civil procedure is met or it is not.
Considering the facts in the favor of either moving party, it seems abundantly clear that nearly any case like this is worthy of a trial on the merits, especially when the defendant admitting that at least some of the pleadings are true.
Disposal of a case by summary judgment when the standards are not met for such a disposal denies litigants their ability to be heard in open court. It’s just too bad a nasty remand is the best an appeals court can do in this instance.
I think we may have to agree to disagree. My comment about the court prematurely granting summary judgment refers only to the fact that, based on the Eighth Circuit’s decision, the trial court did not review the proper information before granting summary judgment. With a better understanding of the standards required (as outlined in the full decision; I focused my post mainly on the “direct evidence” adoption), I have no doubt that the district will file another motion for summary judgment. Given Arkansas’ long and well-documented history of racial discrimination (there’s currently an issue in the news of a police officer using the N word), I think the district will be able to make a pretty good argument that its affirmative action program is valid. Finally, very seldom are the facts “abundantly clear” from an appellate decision. Like all lawyers, appellate courts generally give us only the facts that support their arguments/decisions.