Matthews sued Wal-Mart, arguing that Wal-Mart fired her for stating her religious belief that gays will go to hell, which she maintains is central to her Apostolic-Christian faith. If perceived harassment had really spurred Wal-Mart’s action, Matthews said the company would not have let her continue working with Amy for the next three months during the company’s investigation. The trial court granted summary judgment to Wal-Mart, finding no evidence that similarly situated employees had received different treatment.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, noting the following:

Wal-Mart fired [Matthews] because she violated the company policy when she harassed a coworker, not because of her beliefs, and employers need not relieve workers from complying with neutral workplace rules as a religious accommodation if it would create an undue hardship.               

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The four deputies appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, but the court granted immunity only to three of the deputies, noting:

We have recognized that a prison official may be held to be deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk to inmate safety if he is aware that an inmate is vulnerable to assault and fails to protect him.

The court stated that Bishop failed to specifically identify any deputy to whom he reported Floyd’s abuse or to prove that any deputy other than Deputy James Stanley had enough personal contact with him to be subjectively aware of his vulnerability to attacks or the abuse that he alleges he was suffering. The court found that "Stanley was aware of Bishop’s personal characteristics because he testified that he talked to Bishop quite often on his rounds." The court then found that Stanley could have been aware that Bishop belonged to a class of prisoners particularly vulnerable to sexual assault. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court’s denial of qualified immunity to three of the deputies, but upheld the decision against Stanley.

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The trial court dismissed the lawsuit entirely. On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that most of the case was meritless, including Spiegel’s bid for a different judge on remand. He argued that U.S. District Judge Sandra Townes was biased and “had undertaken to scour the record to find a basis for knocking out plaintiffs’ claims.”

However, the Second Circuit revived Spiegel’s claim that the karate school violated the New York City Human Rights Law barring employers from firing workers “because of an actual or perceived . . . disability” because no New York appellate court had yet addressed whether obesity alone could constitutes a disability the law.

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On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals initially reversed the trial court’s ruling, holding that Reeves had presented a jury question about whether the offensive conduct was based on her sex. In 2009, the court vacated that ruling and agreed to rehear the case en banc. In a unanimous ruling, the court held that a jury could reasonably find that the offensive conduct was “humiliating and degrading” to women specifically, stating as follows:

Instead, a jury reasonably could find that it was a workplace that exposed Reeves to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex were not exposed. Title VII was plainly designed to protect members of a protected group from adverse conditions of employment like those Reeves alleges were endemic to C.H. Robinson.

The court further noted that referring to a female as a “bitch” is “firmly rooted in gender” and that such language “is humiliating and degrading based on sex” regardless of the intended target.

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Facts

Heartland Inns of America, L.L.C. (“Heartland Inns”), operates a group of hotels in Iowa. In July 2005, Breanna Lewis began working for Heartland Inns. Over the next year and a half, Lewis successfully filled several positions related to guest services. Lewis received multiple commendations from her direct supervisors and two merit based pay raises. On December 14, 2006, Lewis was hired to work a full-time position at the front desk of the Ankeny hotel from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., after her supervisor at Ankeny, Lori Stifel, received permission from Barbara Cullinan, Director of Operations for Heartland Inns.

After seeing Lewis, Cullinan told Stifel that Lewis was not a “good fit” for the front desk because of her lack of “prettiness” and the “Midwestern girl look.” Lewis describes her appearance as “slightly more masculine” and notes she prefers to wear loose fitting clothing and avoid makeup. Stifel refused to move Lewis to a night-time position because Lewis had been doing “a phenomenal job at the front desk.” Stifel was asked to resign, and she informed Lewis of Cullinan’s comments regarding her appearance.

Cullinan required Lewis to attend a second interview, and Lewis told Cullinan that she believed her interview was being required only because she did not have the “Midwestern girl look.” Cullinan and Lewis discussed some of the recent policy changes made by Heartland Inns, such as banning smoking and pets, and how such changes might affect revenue. Cullinan encouraged Lewis to share more of her views on the policies and took notes. Three days later, Lewis was fired. The termination letter she received stated that she had “thwart[ed] the proposed interview procedure” and shown “host[ility] toward Heartland’s most recent policies.”

Lewis filed suit against Heartland Inns, asserting she was terminated for not conforming to sex stereotypes in violation of Title VII and Iowa Civil Rights laws. Heartland Inns moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted because Lewis had failed to produce evidence that she was treated differently than similarly situated males.

Appeal

On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that, to survive summary judgment, Lewis must present evidence that (1) she was a member of a protected group, (2) she was qualified to perform the job, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) circumstances permit an inference of discrimination. Once she has presented a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, Heartland Inns must produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action. Then Lewis must prove that Heartland Inn’s proffered reason is pretextual.

The court noted that the prima facie requirement under Title VII is a “flexible evidentiary standard” that was “never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.” Quoting the Supreme Court, the court wrote, “The principal focus of [Title VII] is the protection of the individual employee, rather than the protection of the minority group as a whole.” The court overruled the trial court’s holding that Lewis must produce evidence that she was treated differently than men, noting that a reasonable factfinder could find that (1) Lewis was fired because she lacked the “Midwestern girl look” and (2) Heartland Inns’ reason for termination was pretextual. Accordingly, the case was reversed and remanded.

El-Ganayni filed suit against the DOE to obtain a hearing to contest the decision and alleged that he was fired because he (1) spoke out against the FBI, the war in Iraq, and U.S. foreign policy in Pittsburgh-area mosques and (2) worked as an Imam at a prison where he ran afoul of officials for distributing Muslim literature. The trial court dismissed El-Ganayni’s petition, and he appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Third Circuit upheld the trial court’s decision, noting that El-Ganayni’s claim "could never be meaningfully litigated" and that the "outcome is pre-ordained" due to the broad national security powers given to the Executive Branch. The court based its decision on the 1988 case Department of the Navy v. Egan, in which the United States Supreme Court ruled that while agency action is presumptively reviewable, that presumption is limited when it comes to national security issues. The court explained as follows:

The legal framework applicable to that claim would demand from the DOE an explanation of its decision to revoke El-Ganayni’s clearance, and allow a factfinder to weigh the DOE’s arguments in support of that decision. Egan forbids both.

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Despite our earlier decision, we now hold that the failure to answer a request for a raise qualifies as a compensation decision because the result is the same as if the request had been explicitly denied.

The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. For the full story, click here.

Background Information

Since 1982, the Pulaski County Special School District (the “District”) has been involved in desegregation litigation in federal court.  In 1990, the District reached a settlement agreement, and the Office of Desegregation Management (“ODM”) was created to assist the trial court in supervising the District.  In 2000, a new plan, Plan 2000, was submitted and approved by the trial court.  Plan 2000 required to (1) recruit applicant for administrative positions in a manner designed to develop a racially diverse pool of applicants and (2) assign teachers and other staff in a manner that avoids racial identification of schools. The ODM continues to monitor the District for compliance with Plan 2000.

Facts

Donna Humphries, a white female with a doctorate degree in elementary education, has been employed with the District since 1984 and has worked as an elementary school counselor since 1989. Since 2001, Humphries has unsuccessfully applied for every elementary school assistant principal opening with the District. After complying with Equal Employment Opportunity Commission requirements, Humphries filed suit against the District, asserting claims of racial discrimination under Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983.

Both parties filed motions for summary judgment.  Humphries alleged that the District undisputedly employed (1) a policy of using biracial interview committees for administrative personnel, (2) a preference to employ and advance blacks, (3) racial quotas and goals for hiring black administrators, (4) practice of hiring assistant principals so that at least one assistant principal is a different race than the school’s principals.  She further alleged that statistical evidence established that the District favors black applicant’s in hiring administrative personnel. The District acknowledged its affirmative action policy included the first three goals noted above, but disputed specifically hiring assistant principals based on the race of the principal. The trial court granted the District’s motion, noting that Humphries failed to present any evidence that the affirmative action plan played any role in the District’s decisions not to promote her.

Appeal

On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals joined the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits in holding the following:

[E]vidence that an employer followed an affirmative action plan in taking a challenged adverse employment action may constitute direct evidence of unlawful discrimination. If the employer defends by asserting that it acted pursuant to a valid affirmative action plan, the question then becomes whether the affirmative action plan is valid under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause.

The court then noted that, because the District had never denied the existence of its affirmative action policies, Humphries must show that (1) the District acted in accordance with those policies in failing to promote her and (2) the District’s policies are invalid. To be valid, an affirmative action policy must be (a) remedial and (b) narrowly tailored to meet the goal of remedying past discrimination.  A court order is evidence of such a policy being remedial in nature; however, it cannot be to maintain racial quotas:

But a policy may not “unnecessarily trammel” the rights of non-minorities, and it must be “intended to attain a balance, not to maintain one.”

Because the trial court did not adequately address these issues in its order, the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the case back to the trial court.

In 1999, Zachary Winspear’s brother, Logan, committed suicide.  The brothers had been very close, and Winspear had difficulty with Logan’s suicide, even contemplating suicide himself.  The brothers had been close, in part, because of their strict religious upbringing and rejection of organized religion.  In March 2003, Winspear began working at Community Development, Inc. (“CDI”) as a personal assistant to Charles Schneider, a co-owner of CDI.  Winspear and Schneider spent significant time working together, and Winspear confided to Schneider about Logan’s suicide and its impact on him.  While at CDI, Winspear received multiple promotions and eventually became CDI’s community manager.

In January 2005, CDI hired Schneider’s wife, Lana Sierra, as a receptionist.  Sierra was aware of Winspear’s troubled history with religion and his brother’s suicide.  In late January, Sierra approached Winspear to tell him that she was able to speak with the dead and had communicated with Logan.  Sierra told Winspear that Logan was suffering in hell and that Winspear would also go to hell if he did not “find God.”  The meeting upset Winspear, who asked Sierra not to talk about his brother and then returned to his office where he cried for an extended period of time.  Throughout the rest of the day, and for the next three and a half weeks, Sierra continued to approach Winspear about her “gift,” telling him that he had to “find God” so that he would not go to hell like his brother.  Winspear repeatedly asked Sierra to stop talking to him about Logan.  Sierra’s behavior caused Winspear to again contemplate suicide.

After three weeks of Sierra’s behavior, Winspear approached Schneider to complain about Sierra.  Schneider confirmed that Sierra was able to speak to the dead, advised Winspear to heed her advice, and told Winspear to keep Sierra’s “gift” a secret.  After Winspear’s conversation with Schneider, Sierra stopped talking to Winspear about his brother directly.  Instead, she would mention her “gift” and ask whether he had thought about their previous discussions.  Winspear approached Schneider again, but he refused to remedy the situation.

By March 2005, Sierra had almost completely stopped approaching Winspear about his brother, but continued to ask him about finding religion every one to two weeks over the next five months.  In August 2005, they had a heated confrontation at work over a comment Winspear made regarding Sierra’s former boss, a chiropractor with whom Winspear had a billing dispute.  Winspear left the office after the confrontation, but was notified that he needed to return to work because he did not have permission to be off from work.  Instead of returning, he quit his job.

Winspear subsequently sued CDI, Schneider, and Sierra alleging that they subjected him to a religious-based hostile work environment in violation of Title VII.  CDI, Schneider, and Sierra filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, noting that “Winspear may have raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Sierra’s repeated comments about Winspear’s brother suffering in Hell and about Winspear needing to find God constituted a hostile work environment,” it resolved the claim by stating that “[t]he four- to five-month lapse in time between when Sierra allegedly stopped harassing Winspear and when he resigned [was] fatal to his constructive discharge claim.”

On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the elements of a hostile work environment claim and constructive discharge claim are distinct and separate.  Because the trial court made no specific finding as to Winspear’s hostile work environment claim, the court remanded the case back to the trial court to make such a determination.