On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, Lowrey contended that Johnson was an employee of UBU and was fired for just cause. The court found that Lowrey failed to prove any of his claims, including the point that UBU qualified as an exempt religious organization:

Lowrey does not identify anything in the record besides his testimony as to UBU’s religious nature that would establish UBU as an exempt organization under the statutory definition.

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Matthews sued Wal-Mart, arguing that Wal-Mart fired her for stating her religious belief that gays will go to hell, which she maintains is central to her Apostolic-Christian faith. If perceived harassment had really spurred Wal-Mart’s action, Matthews said the company would not have let her continue working with Amy for the next three months during the company’s investigation. The trial court granted summary judgment to Wal-Mart, finding no evidence that similarly situated employees had received different treatment.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, noting the following:

Wal-Mart fired [Matthews] because she violated the company policy when she harassed a coworker, not because of her beliefs, and employers need not relieve workers from complying with neutral workplace rules as a religious accommodation if it would create an undue hardship.               

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Using an employer’s computer to open pornographic e-mail attachments and access pornographic websites is a serious violation of the standards of behavior that the employer has a right to reasonably expect from an employee, even if the employer has not adopted a policy that prohibits the conduct.

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The trial court dismissed Xodus’s claims because there was insufficient evidence that McCuller was aware of the religious significance of Xodus’s dreadlocks. McCuller testified that he was not aware of the Rastafarian religion and did not equate Xodus’ use of the word ‘belief’ with religion. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court. The court noted that the use of the word ‘belief’ and the dreadlocks themselves were insufficient notice to McCuller of the religious nature of Xodus’s hairstyle: “Unlike race or sex, a person’s religion is not always readily apparent.” Because of this, it was necessary for Xodus to expressly bring his religious belief to McCuller’s attention. Accordingly, the dismissal was affirmed.

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Because we have both been confused, I have wanted us to talk. But that seems to create problems for both of us. When I have tried to talk to you, you seem to run a bit in the opposite direction. And my nervousness leads me to maybe not be entirely forthright. There is so much I would like to tell you, to discuss with you. But even now writing this, there is fear. You, I am sure, understand the risks involved for me. But you have no idea how happy it makes me to hear from you. And as far as where I am standing, there is only one place I would like to be standing. God, help me!

McGraham told an independent hearing officer that she had learned her lesson and was seeking therapy. The officer then suspended her for 90 days and transferred her to another school.

The New York City School District then filed suit against McGraham for additional punishment, and the trial court vacated the suspension and remanded the case for a more severe penalty. On appeal, however, the 1st Appellate Division of New York reversed the decision, ruling that the suspension and transfer constituted sufficient punishment, noting the following:

The penalty imposed here is not so lenient as to be arbitrary and capricious. The hearing officer’s conclusion that [McGraham] was not like to repeat her actions was necessarily a determination based on [her] credibility, and he was in far superior position than [the trial court] to make that determination.

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[I]t was within the board’s discretion to terminate [the officers] for violating the department policies by failing to seek medical help for Salva when she requested medical attention . . . and by treating Salva in a discourteous and undignified manner.

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Chapman asked the Board for Correction of Military Records to vacate the discharge, reinstate him to active duty, or correct his military records so he could retire with 20 years of service. He had been approved to retire in September 2006. Chapman claimed the Coast Guard “condoned for 19 years his marginal weight performance,” and his commanding officer had unfairly singled him out in his last year of service. The board ruled against him, noting that he had previously been placed on weight probation in 1992, 1993, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003.

Chapman then filed a claim under the Military Pay Act, alleging that his commanding officer had used the weight program to remove him from the Coast Guard for filing grievances. The Court of Federal Claims, however, found the board’s conclusion was reasonable based on Chapman’s previous compliance with the weight program through a combination of diet and exercise. The court further noted that compulsive overeating does not qualify as a physical disability in the military.

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Facts

In June 1992, Jeffrey Barrows was hired as an officer with the Fort Smith Police Department. During his employment with the department, he rose from the rank of patrolman to major. At the time of his termination on October 17, 2007, Barrows was in charge of the department’s Administrative Services division.

Barrows served as interim chief of police from approximately August 2006 until January 2007 when Kevin Lindsey was hired as police chief. As chief, Lindsey attempted to implement the Sentinel program, a type of citizen-policing initiative. According to Barrows, (1) Lindsey implemented this program without seeking the input of staff responsible for its execution, (2) the program was inconsistent with the department’s current policies, (3) it wasted public funds, and (4) it potentially contravened state law. Barrows expressed his concerns to Lindsey and then Lindsey’s direct supervisor, Randy Reed, Fort Smith City Administrator. A meeting was then held between Barrows, Lindsey, Reed, and two other top administrators, Major Steve Howard and Major Ricky Brooks. During this meeting, Lindsey asked whether they had confidence in his ability to perform his job. Barrows and Reed stated they did not.

On August 23, 2007, Lindsey filed a complaint with Captain Alan Haney of the Office of Professional Standards, asserting that Barrows (1) failed to observe and adhere to department policies, (2) showed disrespect towards supervisory officers, (3) engaged in conduct unbecoming an officer, and (4) publically criticized and ridiculed the department. Haney investigated the complaint, and a review panel examined the investigative file. After giving Barrows an opportunity to explain his actions, which he refused, the review panel determined that Barrows had violated department rules and policies and should be terminated. The matter was then returned to Lindsey, who agreed that Barrows should be terminated.

After his termination, Barrows filed suit against the City of Fort Smith and Lindsey in his official capacity. He alleged that he was terminated for reporting concerns over Lindsey’s job performance in violation of the Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 21-1-601, et seq. The trial court determined that Barrows had attempted to undermine Lindsey’s authority and to interfere with the department’s administration and, therefore, his termination was appropriate. The court then granted summary judgment on behalf of defendants.

Appeal

On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that the Whistle-Blower Act protects a public employee who reports violations of law or waste of public funds to the appropriate authorities. The law guarantees the pubic employee freedom from discharge, threats, or any other discrimination or retaliations that relates to employment or compensation. If a public employee is punished, the employee may seek actual damages and injunctive relief through civil suit. The public employer, however, has an affirmative defense to the suit if the employee was discharged because of misconduct or poor job performance unrelated to the communication.

The court noted that there was an abundance of evidence that Barrows discussed his views of Lindsey’s competency with various people inside and outside of the department. Barrows also instructed several officers to report to him instead of Lindsey. Based on this information, the court agreed that defendants had an affirmative defense to Barrows’ claim and affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals initially reversed the trial court’s ruling, holding that Reeves had presented a jury question about whether the offensive conduct was based on her sex. In 2009, the court vacated that ruling and agreed to rehear the case en banc. In a unanimous ruling, the court held that a jury could reasonably find that the offensive conduct was “humiliating and degrading” to women specifically, stating as follows:

Instead, a jury reasonably could find that it was a workplace that exposed Reeves to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex were not exposed. Title VII was plainly designed to protect members of a protected group from adverse conditions of employment like those Reeves alleges were endemic to C.H. Robinson.

The court further noted that referring to a female as a “bitch” is “firmly rooted in gender” and that such language “is humiliating and degrading based on sex” regardless of the intended target.

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Facts

Heartland Inns of America, L.L.C. (“Heartland Inns”), operates a group of hotels in Iowa. In July 2005, Breanna Lewis began working for Heartland Inns. Over the next year and a half, Lewis successfully filled several positions related to guest services. Lewis received multiple commendations from her direct supervisors and two merit based pay raises. On December 14, 2006, Lewis was hired to work a full-time position at the front desk of the Ankeny hotel from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., after her supervisor at Ankeny, Lori Stifel, received permission from Barbara Cullinan, Director of Operations for Heartland Inns.

After seeing Lewis, Cullinan told Stifel that Lewis was not a “good fit” for the front desk because of her lack of “prettiness” and the “Midwestern girl look.” Lewis describes her appearance as “slightly more masculine” and notes she prefers to wear loose fitting clothing and avoid makeup. Stifel refused to move Lewis to a night-time position because Lewis had been doing “a phenomenal job at the front desk.” Stifel was asked to resign, and she informed Lewis of Cullinan’s comments regarding her appearance.

Cullinan required Lewis to attend a second interview, and Lewis told Cullinan that she believed her interview was being required only because she did not have the “Midwestern girl look.” Cullinan and Lewis discussed some of the recent policy changes made by Heartland Inns, such as banning smoking and pets, and how such changes might affect revenue. Cullinan encouraged Lewis to share more of her views on the policies and took notes. Three days later, Lewis was fired. The termination letter she received stated that she had “thwart[ed] the proposed interview procedure” and shown “host[ility] toward Heartland’s most recent policies.”

Lewis filed suit against Heartland Inns, asserting she was terminated for not conforming to sex stereotypes in violation of Title VII and Iowa Civil Rights laws. Heartland Inns moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted because Lewis had failed to produce evidence that she was treated differently than similarly situated males.

Appeal

On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that, to survive summary judgment, Lewis must present evidence that (1) she was a member of a protected group, (2) she was qualified to perform the job, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) circumstances permit an inference of discrimination. Once she has presented a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, Heartland Inns must produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action. Then Lewis must prove that Heartland Inn’s proffered reason is pretextual.

The court noted that the prima facie requirement under Title VII is a “flexible evidentiary standard” that was “never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.” Quoting the Supreme Court, the court wrote, “The principal focus of [Title VII] is the protection of the individual employee, rather than the protection of the minority group as a whole.” The court overruled the trial court’s holding that Lewis must produce evidence that she was treated differently than men, noting that a reasonable factfinder could find that (1) Lewis was fired because she lacked the “Midwestern girl look” and (2) Heartland Inns’ reason for termination was pretextual. Accordingly, the case was reversed and remanded.